Abstract. Since the seventies, it has been customary to assume that intentionality is independent of consciousness. Recently, a number of philosophers have rejected this assumption, claiming that intentionality is closely tied to consciousness, inasmuch as non-conscious intentionality in some sense depends upon conscious intentionality. Within this alternative framework, the question arises of how to account for unconscious intentionality, and different authors have offered different accounts. A central goal of this paper is to argue for a broadly Dennettian, interpretivist account of unconscious intentionality. A second goal is to argue that an upshot of interpretivism is that all unconscious intentionality is ultimately grounded is a specific kind of cognitive phenomenology, namely, the phenomenology of conscious interpretive acts.
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The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program (PIRP) can be modeled on the same theoretical structure. Here the rough idea is that the source of all intentionality is the phenomenal character of conscious states, typically construed as a purely internal affair; all other intentionality occurs in virtue of appropriate relations to phenomenally conscious states. Again, different theories within PIRP would differ most centrally on (a) the kind of phenomenal character they take to constitute intentionality (and how it does so) and/or (b) the relation to phenomenal consciousness they take to underlie unconscious intentionality. 3 Several important questions arise within the framework of PIRP. Perhaps the most central are the following three:
• Why should we believe the thesis that only phenomenal intentionality is nonderivative?
• What is the nature of phenomenal intentionality? In particular, what is it about phenomenal character that endows it with intentional content?
• What is the nature of non-phenomenal intentionality? More specifically, what is the relation a non-phenomenal item must bear to a phenomenally intentional state in order to exhibit intentionality?
What I want to do in the bulk of this paper is pursue this last question. There may arise for some readers legitimate worries about the viability and merit of PIRP, but I propose to set these worries aside here. 4 The reason is partly substantive but mostly methodological.
Substantively, it is simply my opinion, for which I argued elsewhere (Kriegel 2003a (Kriegel , 2007 , forthcoming Ch.1) but will not here, that PIRP is in fact viable and merits pursuit.
Methodologically, research programs in both philosophy and science rarely win converts by a priori demonstration of their viability and merit; rather, it is when the research program is actively pursued, and its pursuit is shown to be fruitful and productive, that it flourishes and attracts proponents and exponents. Actually pursuing PIRP is therefore central to making the case for its viability and merit. 5, 6 uriah kriegel draft, comments welcome 4 Our central agenda is thus to seek a satisfactory account of unconscious intentionality within the PIRP framework. Call this the unconscious intentionality question:
(UIQ) For any phenomenally unconscious item x, such that x has intentional content, what makes it the case (i) that x has the intentional content it does and (ii) that x has an intentional content at all?
In §2, I propose an answer to UIQ, an answer that takes its cue from Dennett's (1971 Dennett's ( , 1981 Dennett's ( , 1987 ) interpretivist approach to intentionality. On the account I offer, what makes a phenomenally unconscious item have the intentional content it does, and an intentional content at all, is (very roughly) that it is profitably interpreted to have that content. For reasons we will see in §4, an upshot of this account is that all phenomenally unconscious intentionality derives ultimately from a certain type of cognitive phenomenology, a notion I will introduce and motivate in §3. The upshot, then, is that without cognitive phenomenology there would be no unconscious intentionality. I will close with more general remarks on the crucial role of cognitive phenomenology in the relationship between mind and world.
Interpretivism
(PI) implies that all unconscious intentionality derives from conscious intentionality. 7 Interestingly, there is a NERP-ish approach of intentionality that takes all intentionality to be derived. The idea of this section is to adopt this approach but restrict it to unconscious intentionality (in an independently motivated way).
The approach I have in mind is Dennett's interpretivist "intentional stance" theory. 8 On this view, there is a web of intentional concepts, such as of belief and desire, that we can use to produce a rough-and-ready interpretation of conspecifics and other creatures in real time and "on the go." When we use this web of intentional concepts, we take a stance toward our targets of interpretation that involves conceiving of them as intentional systems; this is the intentional stance. The intentional stance produces a kind of interpretation that is a good enough approximation of the truth to make it useful, but not good enough that we can take it at face value. If we operated without constraints on the employment of time, energy, and other resources, we could produce a much more accurate theory of conspecifics' behavior, in principle a fully accurate one; but this other interpretation would deploy a web of neurophysiological and broadly physical concepts, not the web of intentional concepts we use in everyday life. In everyday life, the most cost-beneficial balance between resource expenditure and interpretative accuracy happens to be that provided by the intentional stance.
On this picture, it is not so much because certain intentional facts hold that certain interpretations become possible as that because those interpretations are possible that the intentional facts hold. Thus, for someone to believe that p just is for the best exercise of the intentional stance to assign to them the belief that p. As Dennett (1981: 72) puts it, "all there is to really and truly believing that p is being an intentional system for which p occurs as a belief in the best (most predictive) interpretation." On this interpretivist view, for an internal state to have intentional content C is for the state's subject to be best interpreted (within the framework of the intentional stance) as being in an internal state with C.
Interpreting someone to be in a certain intentional state is itself an intentional act, however: the act whose content is that someone is in some intentional state. Therefore, Dennett's interpretivism entails that the intentionality of each intentional state derives from the intentionality of some other intentional state, namely, the relevant interpretive state (whose own content presumably derives from that of a second-order interpretive act). It is thus an upshot of Dennett's view that all intentionality is derived (see Dennett 1988 (see Dennett , 1990 ).
An immediate difficulty with this position is that it leads straightforwardly to infinite regress: an item x can acquire the content C only if there is an item y with content C*, where C* = <x has C>, but for y to have that content, there would have to be an item z with content C**, C** = <y has C*>, and so on ad infinitum. 9 The only way to stop the regress is to posit a class of privileged intentional states, such that (i) their intentionality does not derive from interpretation and (ii) they have interpretive acts as a subset. does, and to have one at all, is that the best exercise of the intentional stance would produce an interpretation according to which that item has the intentional content it does, and has one at all.
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Note that in the first instance, the relevant interpretation need not itself be phenomenally conscious. However, if it is not, then as noted above, it must have its own (interpretive) content in virtue of being interpreted by some second-order interpretation, and that second-order interpretation would itself be either conscious or interpreted by a third-order interpretive state, and so on. Ultimately, this regress of interpretations would have to end with a conscious interpretive act. In other words, the relevant interpretations need not be conscious, but they must be part of (potentially one-stepped) chains of interpretations that are capped by conscious interpretations.
We can simplify somewhat the formulation of this interpretivist account of unconscious intentionality by construing unconscious intentionality as the right sort of response-dependent property (Kriegel 2010a). These are properties characterized in terms of their disposition to elicit certain responses in certain respondents under certain conditions. 12 Since we are dealing here with the best exercise of the intentional stance, we can think of the relevant respondents, in the first instance, as ideal interpreters, that is, subjects who exercise the intentional stance perfectly under all conditions. The thesis is then that for any unconscious intentional state, there is some possible ideal interpreter who, under some conditions, produces an intentional interpretation of that state, and moreover does so consciously. 13 If so, we may formulate interpretivism relatively economically as follows:
For any unconscious item x and intentional content C, x has C iff x is such as to elicit in ideal interpreters under ideal conditions a conscious intentional state with the content <x has C>.
Or perhaps more rigorously:
(A1) For any unconscious item x and intentional content C, x has C iff there are a possible conscious item y, a possible ideal interpreter N, and possible conditions K, such that (i) y has the content <x has C> and (ii) x is such as to elicit y in N under K.
I will now offer some clarifications (see also Kriegel 2010a) -in particular, concerning the nature of interpretation, ideal interpreters, and ideal conditions -and then suggest that this view is superior to the alternatives.
I start with clarification of the nature of interpretation. There are, in fact, several possible views on the nature of interpretation, and different versions of interpretivism will differ in adopting different views on that matter. In the literature on interpretation, three main theories seem to compete (Goldman 1989) : the theory theory, simulation theory, and rationality theory. 14 According to theory theory, intentional ascription is based on something like inference to the best explanation from the behavior (including verbal behavior) of the target of ascription, the kind of inference characteristic of theorizing in general. According to simulation theory, intentional ascription is based on the off-line tokening of the very intentional states ascribed, by way of simulation of the target of ascription's internal goings-on. According to rationality theory, intentional ascription is based first and foremost on the application of a principle of charity that casts the target of ascription as a rational agent whose intentional states are by and large justified. In addition to these three "pure" theories that assume all intentional ascription is carried out by a single mechanism, there are also "impure" theories that combine two or three of the above mechanisms. If the above are the only three interpretive mechanisms, this would mean that there are seven possible views of how interpretation works. It may be objected that this view cannot account for altogether non-mental intentionality, such as we find in language, traffic signs, representative art, etc., since it is unclear what the behavioral data for inference to the best explanation are supposed to be.
The interpretivist has two options here, it seems to me. One is to insist on the theorization-cum-rationalization for non-mental intentionality, but offer different data for the relevant inferences to the best explanation. Another, perhaps more promising option is to ground non-mental intentionality in unconscious intentionality, thus offering a two- Having now clarified the nature of interpretation and the ideal interpreter, let us next consider the nature of ideal conditions. Let us say that a condition K is ideal relative to a subject S and a task T just in case S can, under C, perform T the most competently that S can perform T. Given this construal of ideal conditions, and the above construal of the ideal interpretation, it would seem that any conditions are ideal relative to the ideal interpreter and the task of interpretation. 19 However, it may be worthwhile to insist that the conditions relevant to the formulation of interpretivism are conditions of forced choice: the ideal interpreter must either assent to "x has C" or dissent from itsuspending judgment is not an option.
Note that an ideal interpreter, because ideal, would also (correctly) assign content to phenomenally intentional states. 20 So (A) holds not only of unconscious items but also of conscious items. However, the reason it holds is very different in each case. With conscious intentionality, the ideal interpreter tracks intentionality. With unconscious intentionality, s/he constitutes intentionality. There is something akin to a Euthyphro uriah kriegel draft, comments welcome 10 Dilemma here: does the ideal interpreter assign content C to item x because x has C or does x have C because the ideal interpreter assigns to it C? With conscious intentionality it is the former, with unconscious intentionality the latter. Crispin Wright (1992) claims that such a dilemma applies to all biconditionals of this form, and when the biconditional is supposed to capture a genuinely response-dependent property, it must hold a priori. If so, we should probably modify (A1) as follows:
(A2) Epistemically necessarily, for any unconscious item x and intentional content C, x has C iff there are a possible conscious item y, a possible ideal interpreter N, and possible conditions K, such that (i) y has the content <x has C> and (ii) x is such as to elicit y in N under K.
In this formulation, I use epistemic necessity as a formally well-behaved gloss on aprioricity. Roughly, p is epistemically necessary iff p is true in every centered world,
i.e., in every possible world considered as actual.
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It is also important to note that (A)-(A2) do not require in any way the existence of an actual interpreter, let alone an ideal one. They insist that an unconscious item must have the disposition to elicit the right interpretation in the right interpreters, but not that the disposition must be manifested. The non-existence of ideal interpreters only means that the relevant disposition cannot be manifested, not that it is not present.
There may be cases where there is no single best interpretation of some item. In those cases, one ideal interpreter would ascribe to an item content C 1 and another would ascribe to it content C 2 . In such circumstances, (A) entails that the item's content is indeterminate as between C 1 and C 2 . But this kind of content indeterminacy should be extremely infrequent, and to that extent harmless -it is not the kind of corrosive indeterminacy threatened by inscrutability worries. For there is no reason to suppose that in standard cases there is more than one best interpretation. Crucially, since the ideal interpreter knows all the phenomenal-intentional facts, it knows that ordinarily I consciously think of rabbits rather than undetached rabbit parts, and would therefore interpret my relevant unconscious states as about rabbits not undetached rabbit part. Such an interpretation would make better sense of the cognitive, inferential interactions among my various intentional states, some of which are conscious and some unconscious.
Our interpretivism about unconscious intentionality would bring in its train all the hallmarks of the more standard, global type of interpretivism we find in Dennett,
Davidson, and others. For example, interpretivism often goes hand in hand with holism, the view that contents cannot be assigned to individual items but must be assigned to whole groups at once. This is because creatures' behavior admits of several coherent A related doctrine often associated with interpretivism is that massive error and irrationality are a priori impossible. This is because when several coherent interpretations are available, competent selection among them appeals to a principle of charity. For example, if your interlocutor points at your new laptop and says "congratulations on your new capsicum," it is possible to interpret her as either (i) desiring to congratulate you on a new pepper and believing that the word "capsicum" means pepper or (ii) desiring to congratulate you on a new laptop and believing that the word "capsicum" means laptop.
A competent interpreter would always opt for the second interpretation, even though both accommodate the data equally well, because (presumably) it is the more charitable interpretation. The combination of holism and the employment of the principle of charity then tends to undermine the ascription of erroneous and/or irrational contents to other items in the relevant web of unconscious items, with the result that sweeping error and irrationality are ruled out a priori.
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Another doctrine often associated with interpretivism is a kind of irrealism or instrumentalism about intentionality. According to such instrumentalism, intentionality is a useful fiction: the practice intentional ascription is useful for the conduct of everyday life, but does not strictly speaking issue in true descriptions of what actually goes on in the world. At the same time, while ascription of unconscious intentionality is certainly useful, and moreover its existence cannot be appreciated independently of its usefulness according to interpretivism, it does not follow that it is a fiction. In fact, a common form argument reasons from usefulness to truth via inference to the best explanation (Fodor and Lepore 1993). The issues raised by this question are too involved to address here, but let me go on the record expressing my preference for a non-instrumentalist reading of (A2). After all, the response-dependent property is fully integrated in the natural order, is publicly accessible, etc.
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This, then, is the interpretivism about unconscious intentionality that I propose.
What motivates the view to me is that it is vastly preferable to the alternative accounts of unconscious intentionality one can find in the literature. I argue for this in detail in My claim is that interpretivism returns the right results in all cases in which it seems antecedently that we should count a certain unconscious state as intentional.
Importantly, there is something principled in the way interpretivism manages this. The
reason is that what makes it desirable to count something as in the extension of intentionality is not accidentally related to what makes it the case that interpretivism returns the result that it is a case of intentionality. There are two kinds of fact that make it desirable to count a given state as intentional: (i) that it is so treated by cognitive science and (ii) that it is so treated by folk psychology. Certainly in the former case, but probably also in the latter, what makes it desirable to count the state as intentional is that it is explanatorily beneficial to do so. But whenever it is explanatorily beneficial to treat a state as intentional, an ideal interpreter would do so, and therefore interpretivism would ratify the state's status as intentional. Thus it is no accident that interpretivism returns the independently desirable results in the above cases and would probably do so in other cases. The only way it could fail to do so is if there were unconscious states to which we have independent reasons to ascribe intentionality but for which it is explanatorily useless to do. In all likelihood, however, there could be no such states: unlike phenomenally intentional states, we have no first-person acquaintance with unconscious intentional states; our only reason to believe in them is that doing so is theoretically or explanatorily profitable from the third-person perspective.
In the assessment of scientific theories, it is common to distinguish empirical and theoretical virtues: the empirical virtues concern accounting for the data, the theoretical virtues concern parsimony, simplicity, unity, clarity, elegance, conservatism, etc. It is natural to think that a similar distinction applies to philosophical theories, where the independently desirable results play the role of data, such that returning those results is the empirical virtue (or "quasi-empirical," if we prefer). 23 It is clear from the above discussion that interpretivism is more (quasi-)empirically virtuous than its competition.
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It is, in effect, massively confirmed, whereas alternative accounts are often enough disconfirmed.
Cognitive Phenomenology
The most phenomenologically impressive experiences we undergo are visual experiences and somatic experiences: color perception and pain/pleasure, in particular, are often phenomenologically overwhelming. But there is a variety of milder phenomenologies we often experience. For starters, other perceptual phenomenologies, such as olfactory and proprioceptive phenomenology, can be quite subtle and unimposing, as can the phenomenology of sufficiently mild background moods.
Indeed, some phenomenologies may be so unimpressive that it becomes controversial whether they exist. There are many examples of this, but the one I will focus on here is what is often referred to as cognitive phenomenology. The idea is that there is a distinctive phenomenology involved in having an occurrent thought, which moreover is not just the phenomenology of the imagery accompanying the thought, but is proprietary to occurrent thoughts. 25 To say that this phenomenology is proprietary, or sui generis, is to say that it does not reduce to some other, already familiar (perceptual or somatic, in particular) phenomenology.
It is, of course, controversial whether such proprietary cognitive phenomenology exists, but several authors have recently argued that it does (Goldman 1993 , Strawson 1994 , Peacocke 1998 , Siewert 1998 , Horgan and Tienson 2002 , Kriegel 2003b , Pitt 2004 , Klausen 2008 , Tennant 2009 ). 26 The view that it exists admits of several grades (Kriegel 2003b). The strongest claim would be that every type of occurrent thought has its own cognitive phenomenology, such that the cognitive-phenomenal character of believing that p is different from that of believing that q (whenever p ≠ q). A weaker claim would be that cognitive phenomenology varies with attitude but not with content, such that believing that p is phenomenally different from desiring that p but not from believing that q. 27 The weakest claim is that there is a single cognitive-phenomenal character shared by all conscious cognitive states. Proponents of PIRP typically assert the strongest of these claims. And so they should: the more phenomenology there is, the more phenomenal intentionality there is, and the more plausible it becomes that all intentionality derives from phenomenal intentionality.
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In the literature, there are three main argumentative strategies that have been wielded by way of defending the existence of cognitive phenomenology: arguments from phenomenal contrast, arguments from phenomenological overwhelm, and arguments from first-person knowability.
In arguments from phenomenal contrast, two overall conscious episodes of a subject are presented, such that (i) it is intuitively clear that there is an overall phenomenal difference between the two, and (ii) the best explanation of this difference is that one of the two episodes exhibits a cognitive phenomenology that the other does not.
Perhaps the best known instance of this argumentative strategy is Strawson's (1994) contrast of the overall experiences of a French speaker and a non-French-speaker when they listen to the news in French. Strawson argues that there is a phenomenal difference between their overall conscious episodes, and that the difference is best accounted for in terms of an element of understanding-experience present only in the French speaker's stream of consciousness.
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In arguments from phenomenological overwhelm, the contrast between two episodes is replaced with a single episode, clearly cognitive in nature, whose phenomenal character is supposed to be overwhelming in the way that approximates the phenomenological overwhelm involved in visual and somatic experiences and due to which they are unquestionable instances of phenomenality. Perhaps the best known instance of this argument is based on the sudden and acute onset of an experience of grasping something. Opponents have tended to be unmoved by these considerations, claiming that there are better explanations of phenomenal contrast, phenomenal overwhelm, and firstperson knowability than the supposition of cognitive phenomenology. Frustratingly, the disagreement often seems to devolve into a seemingly verbal matter rather quickly. Both sides agree that cognitive states can exhibit some special feature F, but disagree on whether F is a phenomenal feature, and it is unclear in what way the issue goes beyond whether one is willing to apply the term "phenomenal" to F.
Under these conditions, progress would require first and foremost that a characterization of phenomenality be devised which is antecedently neutral and does not prejudge the question of the existence of cognitive phenomenology. In Kriegel 2009
Ch.1, I have suggested that phenomenal consciousness is best characterized as the "explanatory-gap-able property." More specifically, I suggested that we fix the reference of "phenomenality" with the following rigidified definite description: "The property P, such that, in the actual world, there is (the appearance of) an explanatory gap between physical properties and P." Although I cannot expand on this here, it seems to me that an argument could be erected for cognitive phenomenology which would work with this characterization. This would involve conceiving a world in which subjects have no perceptual, somatic, or emotional phenomenology and claiming that the worry captured by the explanatory gap nonetheless appropriately arises for this world. There are conditions involving congenital absence of perceptual phenomenology, such as blindness and deafness, as well as conditions involving congenital absence of somatic phenomenology (e.g., congenital analgesia) and of emotional phenomenology (e.g., perhaps, in certain forms of autism).
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We can certainly envisage a person suffering from all these conditions at once (Kriegel 2003b, Ms), and can therefore conceive of a world where everybody does. The proponent of cognitive phenomenology would then make the following substantive claim: it is rationally appropriate to feel the pull of the explanatory gap for that world. This claim suggests that the explanatory-gap-able property is instantiated in that world, and therefore that phenomenality is instantiated. Since perceptual, somatic, and emotional phenomenalities are not instantiated, it follows that there must be a non-perceptual, nonsomatic, and non-emotional phenomenality. One could then argue that the best candidate for this non-perceptual, non-somatic, and non-emotional phenomenality is cognitive phenomenality. This would be again not a demonstrative argument, but an argument from inference to the best explanation. Its advantage over the previous kinds of argument is that it would not be as susceptible to devolution into verbal dispute.
I develop this sort of argument in more detail elsewhere (Kriegel Ms). Here I will assume the existence of (proprietary or sui generis) cognitive phenomenology, and will concern myself rather with its relation to unconscious intentionality. I want to argue that unconscious intentionality is grounded ultimately in a certain type of cognitive phenomenology, namely, the cognitive phenomenology of conscious interpretation.
Interpretivism and Cognitive Phenomenology
In this final section, I argue that an upshot of interpretivism is the proposition sloganeered in the title: cognitive phenomenology is the basis of unconscious content.
The argument I will present is this:
1) Interpretivism entails that all unconscious content is ultimately grounded in conscious interpretation;
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2) The content of all conscious interpretation is grounded in the phenomenal character of conscious interpretation;
3) The phenomenal character of all conscious interpretation is a kind of cognitive phenomenology; therefore, 4) Interpretivism entails that all unconscious content is ultimately grounded in a kind of cognitive phenomenology.
I have already defended the first premise -that was the mandate of §2. This section defends the second and third premises.
Within NERP, there is no reason to believe the second premise. But the premise is an essential -perhaps the essential -tenet of PIRP. The focus of this paper has been on the nature of unconscious intentionality within PIRP. The other half (if you will) of a PIRP-ish theory of intentionality concerns the theory of conscious intentionality. There are several options here too, but they all have in common that the intentionality of phenomenally conscious states is grounded in those states' phenomenal character.
It is not at all clear how the relevant grounding is to be cashed out, though it is natural to appeal to a certain relation of metaphysical dependence. The relation is surely anti-reflexive and transitive, 35 but it could be legitimately construed either as asymmetric or as anti-symmetric. The anti-symmetric interpretation would entail that the phenomenal character of a phenomenally intentional state does not depend on the state's intentional content, whereas the asymmetric interpretation would not have this entailment -it would be compatible with both one-way and two-way dependence. One could make this difference explicit by subscripting "metaphysical dependence." Another device would be to construe metaphysical dependence as asymmetric and then explicitly distinguish two grades of the grounding thesis: a strong conjunctive thesis claiming that the intentional is grounded in the phenomenal and the phenomenal is not grounded in the intentional, and a weak thesis consisting merely of the first conjunct of the strong thesis. An intriguing version of the this weaker thesis would be an identity thesis: the intentional property and the phenomenal property are one and the same. In this thesis, it is clear that there is no primacy of the phenomenal over the intentional within phenomenal intentionality. If one hears "grounding" as implying primacy, this weaker thesis would not cast the intentional as grounded in the phenomenal. But for present purposes, let us hear "grounding" as uncommitted on the primacy of the phenomenal to the intentional, and committed only There may be other, more tempting cases, of course. Thus, perhaps one can just see that one's friend is smelling something funny, say by seeing a particular facial contortion of one's friend. In this case, one's visual experience ascribes to one's friend an intentional state, namely, an olfactory experience as of a foul odor.
If the first view is the right one, and interpretive acts are always cognitive, it would seem to follow quite straightforwardly that interpretive phenomenology is a variety of cognitive phenomenology, since all phenomenally conscious interpretive acts are construed as cognitive states (beliefs/judgments/thoughts). More interestingly, plausibly this is the case even if the second, "mixed" view is the right one. For it is plausible that the phenomenology of any perceptual interpretive acts is a composite of sensory and cognitive phenomenologies. Observe that our example of such a perceptual interpretive act involves seeing that a friend is smelling something funny by seeing a facial contortion. Arguably, the phenomenal character of seeing the facial contortion exhausts the purely sensory component of the overall experience's phenomenal character.
What one sees by seeing the facial contortion, the phenomenal component that goes beyond seeing the contortion, is a kind of non-sensory phenomenology. Moreover, it is
hard to see what kind of phenomenology such non-sensory phenomenology could be if not cognitive phenomenology. It is certainly not a somatic or emotive phenomenology.
Nor does it seem to be a conative or agentive phenomenology. This leaves cognitive phenomenology as the only natural candidate for understanding this non-sensory phenomenology involved in perceiving someone to smell something funny.
This treatment of such perception requires a conception of perceptual phenomenology as potentially comprised of two components, a sensory-phenomenology component and a cognitive-phenomenology component. 39 It is no part of this conception that the two components must be neatly factorizable. It may well be that perceptual phenomenology consists in a phenomenal fusion of the two components that does not allow for neat separation of their individual contributions. Nonetheless, to the extent that the phenomenal character of a perceptual act comprises this cognitive element or contribution, it is a kind of cognitive phenomenology. My contention is that perceptual acts lacking this kind of cognitive-phenomenal component, such as perceptual experiences of facial contortions, do not have interpretive phenomenology. The only mental acts that exhibit interpretive phenomenology are acts with cognitive phenomenology, and moreover, it is in virtue of their cognitive phenomenology that they exhibit interpretive phenomenology. In other words, their interpretive phenomenology is a kind of cognitive phenomenology.
It may be worthwhile to distinguish the emerging picture of perceptual interpretive acts from a certain historical conception of perception. According to this historical view, perceptual experiences are composites of sensation and belief: to perceive something is to (roughly simultaneously) sense something and believe something. The view suggested here is different. It does not posit two numerically distinct states, a sensation and a belief, but rather allows a perception to be a single unitary state. At the same time, it has some continuity with the historical view, inasmuch as it finds structure in the perceptual phenomenology of that unitary state. This structure casts perceptual phenomenology as a composite of two kinds of phenomenology, sensation-like and belief-like. 40 In any event, the emerging picture portrays perceptual interpretive acts as exhibiting a composite phenomenology comprising a sensory component and a cognitive component, with their interpretive phenomenology being part of the cognitive component, that is, being a form of cognitive phenomenology.
Beyond its natural appeal, this picture is further supported by the fact that our example of a perceptual interpretive act is one of seeing that, therefore one of a propositional attitude, though a perceptual propositional attitude. As Klausen (2008) argues, the phenomenal character propositional attitudes have qua propositional attitudes is always a kind of cognitive phenomenology, and this applies to perceiving-that: insofar as one's perceiving is propositional, one's experience's phenomenal character is cognitive.
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I conclude that both on the first view of conscious interpretive acts, as always purely cognitive, and on the most plausible reading of the second, "mixed" view, according to which some interpretive acts are perceptual, interpretive phenomenology is a kind of cognitive phenomenology. This is the third premise of the argument at the opening of this section.
This completes my preliminary case for the reasoning that grounds unconscious intentionality, via conscious interpretation and interpretive phenomenology, in cognitive phenomenology. I do not pretend to have offered a thorough defense of this argument here. Rather, my aim has been to sketch the case for each of its premises. My hope, however, is that this section has made it prima facie highly plausible that an upshot of interpretivism about unconscious intentionality is that unconscious intentionality is ultimately grounded in cognitive phenomenology.
Conclusion
Cognitive phenomenology may be at the basis not only of unconscious intentionality, but also of conscious intentionality. 1991 , 1992 , Loar 1995 , 2003 , Strawson 1994 , 2005 , 2008 , Horgan and Tienson 2002 , Horgan and Graham 2009 . Other defenses of (PI) include McGinn 1988 , Horst 1996 , Kriegel 2003a , 2007 , forthcoming, Georgalis 2006 , Bourget forthcoming, and as far as I can tell Brentano 1874 and Husserl 1900.
2 See Dretske 1980 , 1981 , 1988 , Fodor 1990 , Millikan 1984 , Harman 1987 . For example, Dretske (1988 combines a teleo-informational account of the all-important natural relation and an intention-based account of the way it grounds other intentionality. The view is that internal states of certain systems are intentional in virtue of being recruited to perform a certain function within the system due to the informational connections they bear to external conditions, and anything intentional that is not intentional for this reason is intentional because we use it with a certain intention (the intention having its intentionality from the relevant natural relation).
3 Later on I will discuss in passing some of the suggestions that have floated for understanding how phenomenal character grounds intentionality in phenomenal intentionality. For a more thorough discussion, see Kriegel forthcoming Ch.3. 4 Proponents of NERP are typically mystified by the notion that phenomenal character can blossom into intentionality: they allow that there may be a sense in which a phenomenal character can "fit" an external object, but suspect that it would also fit any qualitatively indistinguishable object. However, a parallel worry about the sources of intentionality also animates many proponents of PIRP, who are equally mystified as to how external connections can blossom into intentionality: such relations can perhaps "connect" an internal item to an external object, but presumably they would connect it to any perfectly collocated external item. (For example, they would connect the internal item just as well to the fusion of the external object's undetached parts. For this consideration, see Loar 1995 , Horgan and Tienson 2002 , Georgalis 2006 .) These foundational challenges strike me as tremendous for both research programs, and although some insightful work has already been done by way of addressing them, few philosophers are satisfied that the challenges have been fully met. At the same time, few philosophers take this as reason to suspend research within NERP, and the same attitude should attach, I contend, to PIRP.
5 Thus I find that PIRP has been hurt by its underdog status inasmuch as insufficient energy has been channeled toward its pursuit individually and regardless of the prospects of other research programs. Much more energy has been devoted to arguing that it should be pursued than to pursuing it. This is perhaps an understandable predicament for an ascendant research program in the initial phases, but there also comes a time where the program has to actually be pursued.
6 Furthermore, proponents of NERP and PIRP have tended to be quite confrontational, assuming that the two programs are in competition with one another and only one of them can be viable, but there are also ways of being more conciliatory. One way is to hold that a general theory of intentionality will have to incorporate elements from both programs. For example, according to Horgan and collaborators (2002, 2004) , the kind of intentionality which can be the basis for all other intentionality must involve both a phenomenal character and a natural relation to external items. A different way to be conciliatory, which I prefer, is to hold that there are in fact two distinct properties, each with its legitimate claim on the term "intentionality," such that one behaves roughly the way indicated in NERP and one roughly the way indicated in PIRP. Thus, in his response to Searle's (1991) claim that intentionality depends essentially on consciousness, Davies (1995) argues that dependence on consciousness characterizes some kinds of aboutness but not others; which kinds of aboutness should be called "intentionality" may then be a merely verbal matter. My own inclination would be to call the NERP-ly property representation and reserve the term intentionality for the PIRP-ly property (the point of PIRP could then be put as the rejection of a "representational account of intentionality"). But if this labeling policy is deemed insufficiently neutral, I would be perfectly happy to use the labels "intentionality 1 " and "intentionality 2 " instead.
7 I say "implies" because although (PI) states that only conscious intentionality is underived, and this entails that all unconscious intentionality is derived. It would strictly follow that all unconscious intentionality derives from conscious intentionality only on the assumption that all derived intentionality derives from underived intentionality. This assumption is not tautologous, however, as far as I can tell. Thus, Bourget (forthcoming) seems committed to its denial.
interpretivism I am defending here. The latter accounts for intentionality in terms of interpretation. The former offers an account of how interpretation works. 25 It is not part of this claim that there can be no phenomenally unconscious occurrent thoughts. The claim is merely that, in addition to those, there are also phenomenally conscious occurrent thoughts. 26 For defenses by more historical figures, see Husserl 1900 and Moore 1953. 27 This view could be naturally augmented by the claim that there are also differences in the phenomenal intensity of attitudes: believing that p with great conviction is phenomenally different from believing that p with some doubt in one's heart. 28 At the same time, it is important to note that (PI) can turn out to be true even if there is no such thing as cognitive phenomenology at all. Thus cognitive phenomenology is unnecessary for PIRP, though it would be greatly helpful, so to speak. Siewert's delayed understanding concerns experiences in which we suddenly understand a piece of text we have been rereading and trying to understand for a while (imagine suddenly thinking of kites on your own when reading the above passage). Intellectual Gestalt shifts, meanwhile, concern experiences in which a phenomenon is construed one way but is suddenly reinterpreted another way; Siewert (this volume) illustrates this with an entertaining exchange he heard in Miami on an unbearably hot day, in which one woman said to the other "I am so hot" and the other responded "you don't have to brag about it."
31 Schematically, the argument proceeds as follows: we have a special, immediate access to our cognitive states (and their contents); only to conscious experiences (and contents) can we have this kind of special access; therefore, our cognitive states (and their contents) are conscious experiences (and experientialintentional).
32 An earlier argument of a similar form is developed by Goldman (1993) and recently endorsed by Lycan (2008) . 33 I add a parenthetical mention of appearance because it is not meant to be built into this characterization of phenomenality that the explanatory gap is unbridgeable. Since some people hear the term "explanatory gap" as committing to the impossibility of bridging, and other as committing to the impossibility of a priori bridging, whereas I do not mean to characterize phenomenality in a way that commits to the existence of such an unbridgeable gap between it and physical property, I add the reference to an appearance. 34 The renowned high-functioning autistic Temple Grandin reports (Grandin 1996) experiencing only four types of emotion: joy, sadness, fear, and anger. Subtler emotions are unfamiliar to her experientially, though she has managed to understand their nature in a purely intellectual, bloodless manner. This is an instance of congenital restriction of one's emotional phenomenology. We can readily envisage someone suffering from congenital absence of such phenomenology.
35 So (a) there is no x which metaphysically depends upon itself, and (b) whenever some x metaphysically depends on y and y metaphysically depends on z, x metaphysically depends upon z.
36 This is not to say that the intentional commonality underlies the phenomenal commonality rather than the other way around. In fact, it is not to comment at all on the order of explanation, or order of constitution, between the intentional and phenomenal commonalities. 37 Here too, none of this prejudges either the order of explanation or the order of constitution between interpretive content and interpretive phenomenology. As I argue immediately in the text, for the proponent of PIRP the order goes from phenomenology to content: conscious interpretive acts have their interpretive content because of their interpretive phenomenology. 38 It may be objected that this would work only if cognitive phenomenology is individuative in Pitt's (2004) sense, that is, if there is a different kind of cognitive phenomenology for every type of conscious cognitive state. My response is to simply accept the objector's claim and subscribe to the claim that cognitive phenomenology is individuative. As indicated in §2, this is not mandatory for holding that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology. But I accept the objector's claim that it is mandatory for holding that cognitive phenomenology is the basis of unconscious intentionality. 39 Of course, the view does allow perceptual experiences with sensory phenomenology only. Perhaps a perception of a facial contortion is a case in point: an experience with a purely sensory perceptual phenomenology. But the point is that, in addition to such experiences, this conception allows also for more sophisticated perceptual experiences, ones whose phenomenology comprises a cognitive element. 40 In a way, then, the difference between the view presented here and the historical view is the difference between making a claim about states and making a claim about properties of states. Also, the view presented here is uncommitted on the issue of factorizability, whereas the historical view is committed. 41 On some understandings of what it is for a state to be "cognitive," this may be a conceptual truthnamely, in case having propositional content is sufficient for qualifying as cognitive. However, even if we use another criterion for being cognitive, it strikes me as substantively true that perceptual propositional attitudes have a cognitive phenomenology (see, again, Klausen 2008).
42 Thus every phenomenally intentional state has a phenomenal character that involves phenomenal taking as a component, which is a cognitive component of its phenomenal character, and it in virtue of this cognitive component that the state is intentional. This may raise the objection that certain animals and neonates may be robbed of intentionality. There are probably reasonable responses to this objection, but a full discussion would take us to far afield. 43 Similarly, according to Georgalis, the essential subjectivity of conscious intentional state, in virtue of which they are such, is a "non-sensory" feature. Under certain assumptions (which Georgalis may or may not accept), this could be take to mean that this essential subjectivity is a kind cognitive phenomenology. 44 For comments on a previous draft, I am indebted to David Chalmers, Nicholas Georgalis, Michelle Montague, David Pitt, two readers for OUP, and especially Tim Bayne. For very helpful conversations, I would like to thank George Graham, Terry Horgan, and Amie Thomasson. I also benefited from presenting the paper at a conference at the University of Bern, and would like to thank the audience there, in particular Michelle Montague, Philippe Keller, Sebastian Leuggers, Gianfranco Soldati, and Galen Strawson. The paper was partly written during a research fellowship at the University of Sydney, to which I am greatly indebted.
